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ANALYSIS OF DATA ERASURE
CAPABILITY ON SSHD DRIVES FOR
DATA RECOVERY
Professor Andrew Blyth
Technology Research Centre (TRC), DPG, 50 Brook Street, Mayfair, London, UK.
ab@dpgovernance.com
ABSTRACT
Data Protection and Computer Forensics/Anti-Forensics has now become a critical area of
concern for organizations. A key element in this is how data is sanitized at end of life. In this
paper, we explore Hybrid Solid State Hybrid Drives (SSHD) and the impact that various
Computer Forensics and Data Recovery techniques have when performing data erasure upon
a SSHD.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The modern storage environment is rapidly
evolving. Data may pass through multiple
organizations, systems, and storage media in
its lifetime. The pervasive nature of data
propagation is only increasing as the Inter-
net and data storage systems move towards
a distributed cloud-based architecture. As a
result, more parties than ever are responsi-
ble for effectively sanitizing media and the
potential is substantial for sensitive data to
be collected and retained on the media. This
responsibility is not limited to those organi-
zations that are the originators or final rest-
ing places of sensitive data, but also interme-
diaries who transiently store or process the
information along the way. The efficient and
effective management of information from
inception through disposition is the respon-
sibility of all those who have handled the
data. Studies have shown that residual data
can still be found on second hand disk drives
(Jones etc al., 2009). Data Protection and
GDPR (Linder, 2016) now legally require
the report of a data breach, thus the pro-
cessing of data, and data erasure, at end
of life has become of critical concern. The
role and function of this paper is to exam-
ine the current state of play in relation to
the data sanitization of Solid-State Hybrid
Drives (SSHD). A number of data recovery
methods will be used to explore the capa-
bilities of COTS and Commercial data san-
itization methods and they relate to SSHD.
The following is the list of data sanitization
methods that will be evaluated:
• Standard Open Source Tools.
• Data Sanitization methods such as
NIST 800-88 (Kissel etc al., 2014),
British HMG Infosec Standard 5, ICT
Security Manual (Australian Govern-
ment, 2016).
The followings is the list of data recovery
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methods that will be used to perform the
evaluation.
• Non-Invasive/Non-Destructive - Com-
mercial Forensic Tools such as Encase
(Widup, 2014), and Access Data FTK
(Carbone, 2014), and open-source tools.
• Invasive/Non-Destructive - Commercial
Data Recovery Tools such as PC3000
UDMA/SSD and Salvation Data.
• Invasive/Destructive - Chip-Off Data
Recovery Tools such as PC3000 Flash
and VNR, and attack methods such as
JTAG and SPI.
The basic experimental method that will be
used is that structured/known-data will be
written to every logical block address on the
SSHD via a defined and repeatable method.
The data sanitization tools will be executed
over a sample set and that output shall be
analyzed using the data recovery methods
listed above. Another key element to be ex-
plored in this study relates to the operating
system, given the nature of the interface, can
the operating system identify a SSHD and
then access various elements of it directly?
Solid-state hybrid drive (also known by the
initialism SSHD) refers to products that in-
corporate a significant amount of NAND
flash memory into a hard disk drive (HDD),
resulting in a single, integrated device. The
term ’SSHD’ is a more precise term than the
more general hybrid drive, which has previ-
ously been used to describe SSHD devices
and non-integrated combinations of solid-
state drives (SSDs) and hard disk drives
(Micheloni, 2016). The fundamental design
principle behind SSHDs is to identify data
elements that are most directly associated
with performance (frequently accessed data,
boot data, etc.) and store these data el-
ements in the NAND flash memory. This
has been shown to be effective in delivering
Figure 1. Basic SSHD Architecture
significantly improved performance over the
standard HDD. In Figure-1 we can see the
basic SSHD architecture.
The basic principle behind a SSHD is that it
functions as a single device with a SATA in-
terface. As far as the host computer system
is concerned, the SSHD functions as a single
ATA device and conforms to the ATA tech-
nical specification (The Serial ATA Interna-
tional Organization, 2016). For the purposes
of this study a Seagate Laptop ST500LM000
SSHD has been selected as the test subject.
The Seagate Laptop ST500LM000 SSHD is
a standard SSHD drive that complies with
the SSHD architecture and ATA protocol
standards. Making decisions about which
data elements are prioritized for NAND flash
memory is at the core of SSHD technology.
The SSHD using the Solid State component
of the drive as a buffer to which output is
written to by the controller. The aim is for
the Solid State component of the SSHD drive
to function as a cache. Solid State Hybrid
Drives can operate in one of two modes:
• Self-optimized mode
– In this mode of operation, the
SSHD works independently from
the host operating system or host
device drives to make all decisions
related to identifying data that
will be stored in NAND flash
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memory. This mode results in a
storage product that appears and
operates to a host system exactly
as a traditional hard drive would.
• Host-optimized mode (or host-hinted
mode)
– In this mode of operation, the
SSHD enables an extended set of
SATA commands defined in the so-
called Hybrid Information feature,
introduced in version 3.2 of the Se-
rial ATA International Organiza-
tion (SATA-IO) standards for the
SATA interface. Using these SATA
commands, decisions about which
data elements are placed in the
NAND flash memory come from
the host operating system, device
drivers, file systems, or a combina-
tion of these host-level components
(The Serial ATA International Or-
ganization, 2016).
2. TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF
SEAGATE LAPTOP
SSHD
The Seagate Laptop ST500LM000 SSHD
(Model ST500LM000-1EJ162), has 16,383
cylinders, 16 heads and 63 sectors. We can
identify the drive’s parameters using the hd-
param tool.
$ hdparam −I /dev/sdb
/dev/sdb :
ATA device , non−removable media
Model Number :
ST500LM000−1EJ162
S e r i a l Number : W3705BXW
Firmware Rev i s ion : DEM3
Transport :
SATA 1.0 a , SATA I I Extensions ,
SATA 2 . 5 , SATA 2 . 6 , SATA
3.0
. . . .
Con f igurat ion :
Log i ca l max cur rent
c y l i n d e r s 16383 16383
heads 16 16
s e c t o r s / t rack 63 63
−−
CHS current s e c t o r s :
16514064
LBA user s e c t o r s :
268435455
LBA48 user s e c t o r s :
976773168
Log i ca l Sector s i z e :
512 bytes
Phys i ca l Sector s i z e :
4096 bytes
Log i ca l Sector−0 o f f s e t :
0 bytes
dev i ce s i z e :
476940 MBytes
. . . .
Analysis of the above shows that the drive
is identifying itself as a standard HDD. The
next test that we can conduct on the SSHD
is to detect the presence of a HPA. The fol-
lowing shows that the HPA is disabled and
thus not present on the SSHD.
$ hdparam −N /dev/sdb
/dev/sdb :
max s e c t o r s : 976773168/976773168
HPA i s d i s ab l ed
We can detect the presence of a the DCO
via the following:
$ hdparam −−−dco−i d e n t i f y /dev/sdb
/dev/sdb :
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DCO Checksum v e r i f i e d .
DCO Revis ion : 0x0002
The f o l l o w i n g f e a t u r e s can be
s e l e c t i v e l y d i s ab l ed v ia DCO:
Trans fe r modes :
mdma0 mdma1 mdma2
udma0 udma1 udma2 udma3 udma4
udma5 udma6
Real max s e c t o r s : 976773168
ATA command/ f e a t u r e s e t s :
SMART s e l f t e s t e r r o r l o g HPA
. . . .
The ATA interface supports LBA-48 com-
mands and MAX LBA is 976.773,168. As far
as Technical components are concerned, the
Seagate Laptop ST500LM000 SSHD makes
use of the following items:
• An LSI B69002V0 drive controller. The
motor is controlled by a Texas Instru-
ments SH6966 motor driver.
• A WinBond 25Q80BW16 64MB DDR2
IC acts as the cache for the drive that
holds the firmware. This IC is of type
25Q80, with BW packaging.
• To manage flash memory, an eAS-
IC/Seagate 50415 is utilized.
• The 8GB of Toshiba
TH58TEG6D2HBA46 BGA/132
NAND flash is present for the ”solid
state” portion of the SSHD.
The Seagate Adaptive Memory acts as a
large cache for frequently accessed data to
increase performance, such as booting Win-
dows or loading programs. From the user’s
perspective, the caching operates in the
background, and is designed to work seam-
lessly and be invisible to the user. Analysis
of the PCB showed that from the perspec-
tive of data recovery there are two memory
integrated circuits worthy of investigation:
• SPI FLASH - WINBOND /
25Q80BW16.
• NAND Flash Solid State Memory -
TOSHIBA / TH58TEG6D2HBA46.
3. THE BENCH MARK
To create a single benchmark against which
all data sanitization methods could be eval-
uated, a set of Seagate Laptop ST500LM000
drives had data placed on them. Each
drive was connected to a Unix Machine run-
ning CentOS 6.9. Using the following a
fixed string of 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A,
0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A was written to
every LBA on the device a number of time,
thus complying with NIST 800-88 (Kissel
etc al., 2014). The mount point for the
ST500LM000 was identified using the follow-
ing:
[ 9 3531 . 438391 ] s c s i 2 : 0 : 0 : 0
Di rec tAcces s ATA ST500LM000−1EJ16
SM15 PQ: 0
[ 93531 . 438639 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
976773168 512−byte l o g i c a l b locks
[ 93531 . 438642 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
4096−byte p h y s i c a l b locks
[ 93531 . 438886 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
Write Protect i s o f f
[ 9 3531 . 438889 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
Mode Sense : 00 3a 00 00
[ 93531 . 439030 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
Write/Read cache : enabled .
[ 9 3531 . 439748 ] sdb : sdb1
[ 93531 . 440366 ] sd 2 : 0 : 0 : 0 [ sdb ]
Attached SCSI d i sk
According to the NIST Special Publication
800-88 Section 2.3 (p. 6): ”Basically the
change in track density and the related
changes in the storage medium have created
a situation where the acts of clearing and
purging the media have converged.” That is,
for ATA disk drives manufactured after 2001
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(over 15 GB), clearing by overwriting the
media once is adequate to protect the me-
dia from both keyboard and laboratory at-
tack. Please note that this method for plac-
ing data on the device does not write data
to the DCO and HPA, nor does it write data
to the firmware.
centos@ajcb lyth$ yes ”ZZZZZZZZ”
> /dev/sdb 2> /dev/ n u l l
Data is placed on the device via the following
set of LBA 48 Mode write commands.
• The WRITE SECTOR(S) command
(OP Code: 0x30h)
– This command writes from 1 to
256 logical sectors as specified in
the Count field. A count of 0 re-
quests 256 logical sectors:
• The WRITE SECTOR(S) EXT com-
mand (OP Code: 0x34h)
– This command is mandatory for
devices that implement the 48-bit
Address feature set. This com-
mand writes from 1 to 65,536 log-
ical sectors as specified in the
Count field. A sector count value
of 0 requests 65,536 logical sectors.
To validate that data had been written
correctly to every Logical Block Address
on the device, Encase (Widup, 2014) and
FTK (Carbone, 2014) where used to im-
age the SSHD and check that on the
string 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A,
0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A was present.
4. TOOL TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS
4.1 Tool: Open Source
To perform data erasure on the SSHD using
open source tools the dd command was uti-
lized. The following command was used to
place zeros on the user space on the SSHD.
$ dd i f =/dev/ zero o f=/dev/sdb
The process for erasing the data on the
SSHD was that the driver was connected to
the UNIX system and the above command
was executed.
4.1.1 Method:
Non-Invasive/Non-Destructive
The Non-Invasive/Non-Destructive method
for analyzing the SSHD is to forensically im-
age the device using tools such as ENCase
(Widup, 2014), and FTK (Carbone, 2014).
In addition, a set of open source tools such
TAFT (Altheide, 2011) / (Vidstrom, 2015).
When both of these techniques were applied
to the SSHD they identified nothing but ze-
ros on the User Data area (0 to MAX LBA)
on the drive.
4.1.2 Method:
Invasive/Non-Destructive
This method involves using standard data
recovery tools to extract data from the de-
vice. These tools two data recovery methods
are executed:
• The first method is data extraction
via reading data from 0 to MAX LBA.
This method involves the data recovery
tools having direct access to the ATA
bus and generating/executing their own
ATA commands.
• The second method uses standard data
recovery and a serial connection to the
device to read the firmware located on
the device.
Investigation of the SSHD using tools such
as PC3000, etc., showed that the NAND
Flash memory element of the SSHD is not
visible, and thus the SSHD functioned as
a single drive, all that was visible was the
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Firmware, SMART logs and User Data from
0 to MAX LBA. Both methods listed above
showed that there was no residual data left
in either the Firmware/SMART-Logs or the
User Data area from 0 to MAX LBA.
4.1.3 Method: Invasive/Destructive
The Invasive/Destructive method for ana-
lyzing the SSHD is to physically remove
the WINBOND / 25Q80BW16 and
TOSHIBA / TH58TEG6D2HBA46
integrated circuits and then using advanced
data recovery tools to attempt to read them.
All such tests yield negative results, in that
no test data that had been written to the
drive could be located.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The technical analysis of the SSHD drives
architecture (See Figure 1) shows that the
SSD component of the SSHD drive is func-
tioning as a inline buffer to the HD compo-
nent of the SSHD. From a data recovery per-
spective, the act of writing controller data
from Zero to MAX LBA purges the buffer
and overwrites every data element/LBA of
of the SSHD. While it is true that no data
could be recovered from the two integrated
circuits (WINBOND/25Q80BW16 &
TOSHIBA/TH58TEG6D2HBA46 ), it
should be noted that open source data era-
sure tools do not remap the drive in-terms of
resetting the P/G lists. Thus if an LBA was
to fail while holding any test data, the open
source tools would not erase this data and
thus technically data could still be present
on the SSHD.
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